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Virginia tax procedures have been aptly described as "more a mat-
ter of lore than statute."' The commonwealth's tax appeals procedure is
a prime example: despite obvious problems with the current procedure,
the General Assembly has failed to enact detailed legislation creating an
adequate tax appeals procedure and, in fact, recently considered and re-
jected such legislation.
The time has come for the Virginia General Assembly to create an
accessible, fair, and efficient tax appeals procedure. This article will first
consider the historical development of Virginia tax procedures and
describe the current commonwealth tax appeals procedure. Second, it
will focus on serious problems at various levels of the present procedure,
which themselves reveal the pressing need for procedural reform. Third,
it will consider the desirability of a statewide independent tax appeals
adjudication body and, finding a significant need for such an entity, will
consider questions concerning its form and procedure.
I. Historical Background
The available materials concerning Virginia tax procedures consist
of a sparse statutory framework,2 no comprehensive published regula-
tions, a few mostly old judicial decisions,' two law review articles,4 and a
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. B.S. 1962, Wheeling College;
J.D. 1965, Georgetown University; LL.M. 1966, Harvard University. This article was made
possible through a research grant from the Frances Lewis Law Center. The author wishes
to thank Thomas R. Bender, a third-year student at Washington and Lee School of Law, for
his assistance in the preparation of this article.
All nonpublished materials cited in this article have been placed on file in the office of
the Washington and Lee Law Review, Lexington, Virginia.
' Letter from William L.S. Rowe, member, Practices and Procedures in the Collection
and Administration of State Taxes Study Committee, to Author (May 20, 1981).
2 VA. CODE §§ 58-28 to -48.5, §§ 58-1118 to -1159 (Repl. Vol. 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1981)
contain most of the statutory material concerning Virginia tax procedure.
3 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. United Airlines, 219 Va. 374, 248 S.E.2d 124 (1978);
Webster v. Department of Taxation, 219 Va. 81, 245 S.E.2d 252 (1978; Department of Taxa-
tion v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 217 Va. 121, 225 S.E.2d 870 (1976); Department of Taxation v. Pro-
gessive Community Club, 215 Va. 732, 213 S.E.2d 759 (1975); Winchester T.V. Cable v. State
Tax Comm'r, 216 Va. 286, 217 S.E.2d 885 (1975); Golden Skillet Corp. v. Commonwealth, 214
Va. 276, 199 S.E.2d 511 (1973); Commonwealth v. Radiator Corp., 202 Va. 13, 166 S.E.2d 44
(1960); Commonwealth v. P. Lorillard Co., 129 Va. 74, 105 S.E. 683 (1921); Commonwealth v.
Smallwood Mem. Inst., 124 Va. 142, 97 S.E. 805 (1919; Commonwealth v. Tradegar Co., 122
Va. 506, 95 S.E. 279 (1918); Union Tanning Co. v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 610, 96 S.E. 780
(1918); Commonwealth v. Schmelz, 114 Va. 364, 76 S.E. 905 (1913); Johnson v. Trustees of
Hampton Normal & Agric. Inst., 105 Va. 319, 54 S.E. 31 (1906).
' See Davis, Ancient Simplicity is Gone: Procedural Aspects of Relief from Taxes
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great deal of oral tradition. The reasons for the basically unstructured
nature of the commonwealth's tax procedures are, of course, speculative
but the historical authority of the office of Virginia Tax Commissioner
was clearly a significant factor. One individual, C.H. Morrissett, held the
position from 1926 until 1969, more than forty years.' Not surprisingly,
because of his long tenure in office and the basic one-party political
structure in Virginia during those years, Commissioner Morrissett was
accorded, and exercised, extraordinary influence over the development
of Virginia tax law.
Prior to 1966, the Virginia Department of Taxation had never pub-
lished comprehensive written regulations. Under the previous proce-
dure, when a taxpayer challenged an assessment by the Tax Department
in court, the Commissioner or one of his subordinates took the stand and
testified as to the Department's interpretation of the law. As this proce-
dure evolved, the courts eventually applied to such testimony the ad-
ministrative law doctrine which accords "great weight" to published
statutory interpretations of an administrative official. Thus, the mere
testimony of the Commissioner as to his view of the law was accorded
the great weight normally reserved for published regulations.8
Several decisions by the Virginia Supreme Court during this period
reflect the great deference accorded to the Commissioner's view of the
law. In Richmond Food Stores, Inc. v. Richmond,' a taxpayer used a let-
ter from the Commissioner in the trial court to support his position that
he should be taxed under a certain classification for purposes of a city
license tax. The supreme court accepted the taxpayer's contention, and
declared, "Mr. Morrissett is a recognized tax expert, and his views upon
the question involved are entitled to the same careful consideration we
would accord to a recognized text-writer upon a given subject."8 In
Roanoke v. Michaels Bakery Corp.,9 the City of Roanoke claimed it had
authority to tax the delivery trucks, furniture, and fixtures of a bakery
as tangible personal property, while the commonwealth asserted the
Administered by the Virginia Department of Taxation, 9 U. RICH. L. REv. 121 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Davis]; Note, Property Taxation in Virginia, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 589,
642 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Property Taxation in Virginia].
' See 1925-26 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH at 8; 1968-69 REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH at 18.
' In federal tax law, judicial deference is accorded only to Treasury Regulations
published in the Federal Register and subject to public notice and comment. It is not even
accorded to published revenue rulings and procedures. See Stubbs, Overbeck & Assoc's v.
United States, 445 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1971). The Introduction to each edition of the Internal
Revenue Bulletin contains the following statement: "Rulings and procedures in the Bulletin
do not have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations .... Moreover, the
Internal Revenue Code prohibits according any precedential value to private letter rulings.
See I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3); Rev. Proc. 80-20, § 17, 1980-1 C.B. 633.
7 177 Va. 592, 15 S.E.2d 328 (1941).
8 Id. at 596, 15 S.E.2d at 329.
1 180 Va. 132, 21 S.E.2d 788 (1942).
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right to tax it as intangible property. The Tax Commissioner testified
that delivery trucks, furniture, and fixtures should be classified as in-
tangible property. Despite the orthodox property law classification of
these items as tangible property, the court accepted the Commissioner's
view, stating "the practical construction given to a constitutional provi-
sion by public officials and acted upon by the people is ... entitled to
great weight.""0
With the Tax Commissioner exercising this kind of authority with
respect to his interpretations of the law, and without the benefit of any
published regulations, taxpayers were in a very difficult position when
they disputed an assessment made by the commonwealth. A survey of
reported Virginia Supreme Court decisions from 1945 to 1980, under-
taken in connection with this article," indicates a quite favorable at-
titude on the part of the court toward the Commissioner's position. Of
the commonwealth tax cases, the supreme court decided sixty-nine per-
"o Id at 143, 21 S.E.2d at 793.
" In a Virginia tax case, the burden is on the taxpayer to prove that the assessment is
contrary to law, or that the tax administrator abused his discretion and acted in an ar-
bitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner. Department of Taxation v. Lucky Stores, 217
Va. 121, 127, 225 S.E.2d 870, 874 (1976).
1 A summary of the survey results follows:
A) Total number of cases: 85
commonwealth: local:
36/85 (42%) 49/85 (58%)
B) Total trial court decisions reversed on appeal: 43/85 (51%)
commonwealth: local:
20/36 (56%) 23/49 (47%)
C) Trial court decisions in favor of taxpayer: 43/85 (51%)
commonwealth: local:
22/36 (61%) 21/49 (43%)
D) Trial court decisions in favor of taxpayer reversed on appeal: 24/43 (56%)
commonwealth: local:
17/22 (77 0 ) 7/21 (33%)
E) Trial court decisions in favor of taxing authority: 42/85 (49%)
commonwealth: local:
14/36 (39%) 28/49 (57%)
F) Trial court decisions in favor of taxing authority reversed on appeal:
19/42 (45 0 )
commonwealth: local:
3/14 (21%) 16/28 (57%)
G) Supreme court decisions in favor of taxpayer: 41/85 (48%)
commonwealth: local:
11/36 (31%) 30/49 (61 0 )
H) Supreme court decisions in favor of taxing authority: 44/85 (52%)
commonwealth: local:
25/36 (69%) 19/49 (39%)
1981] 1117
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cent in favor of the Commissioner and only thirty-one percent in favor of
the taxpayer. The pattern was reversed in local tax cases. Sixty-one per-
cent of the decisions favored the taxpayer while thirty-nine percent
favored the taxing authority. Significantly, of twenty-two trial court
decisions in favor of the taxpayer in commonwealth tax cases, seventeen
were reversed by the supreme court on appeal. This could indicate a
more favorable attitude toward taxpayers in the local circuit courts than
in the supreme court.
Perhaps because of this judicial deference to the Commissioner's in-
terpretations, and to his position in general, there were very few decided
commonwealth tax cases in the supreme court-and presumably in the
circuit courts also-prior to 1970.1 The odds against a taxpayer winning
a court test were such that, in most situations, it was wiser to settle or
give in.14 Apparently, most tax disputes during Commissioner Mor-
rissett's tenure were decided by compromise and settlement rather than
by litigation, and the procedures for settlement of dispute were ex-
tremely informal.
Several significant developments occurred, however, between 1966
and 1972. First, the Virginia General Assembly enacted the Retail Sales
and Use Tax in 1966," and the Department of Taxation issued regula-
tions under it in that same year." These were the first and only com-
prehensive regulations ever published with respect to a Virginia com-
monwealth tax. In addition, Virginia adopted the concept of conformity
to the federal income tax as of 1972.17 Finally, Commissioner Morrissett
resigned in 1969 and was replaced by William H. Forst in 1971.18 Commis-
sioner Forst instituted a field audit staff for the Tax Department, which
"s The survey revealed only 16 reported commonwealth tax cases in the Virginia
Supreme Court during the 25 years from 1945 to 1970.
" The "great weight" rule remained entrenched in the supreme court until very
recently. In Winchester T.V. Cable Co. v. Comm'r, 216 Va. 286, 290, 217 S.E.2d 885, 889
(1975), the court stated, "[C]onstruction of a statute by a State official charged with its ad-
ministration is entitled to great weight." The court made no distinction between published
and unpublished regulations in this regard. But, in Department of Taxation v. Champion
Int'l Corp., 220 Va. 981, 992, 265 S.E. 2d 720, 726 (1980), the court finally distinguished be-
tween published and unpublished interpretations:
The Department may not rely upon administrative policy not promulgated to the
public. If the interpretation placed upon a statute by those charged with its en-
forcement has continued for a long period of time, it is presumed the legislature
has acquiesced in the interpretation . . .But the presumption of legislative ac-
quiescence presupposes knowledge of the administrative construction. Without
publication of the construction placed upon the statute by the Department, no
presumption of legislative acquiescence attaches.
Furthermore, the Commissioner, under recently enacted legislation, will specifically be
denied the "great weight" presumption for unpublished interpretations after 1984. See text
accompanying notes 25-35 infra.
'5 1966 Va. Acts ch. 151, enacting VA. CODE §§ 58-441.1 to .51.
18 See Virginia Sales, Receipts or Use Taxes, STATES AND Loc. TAXES (P-H) 22,100.
1971 Va. Acts, Spec. Sess. ch. 171, enacting VA. CODE §§ 58-151.01 to .41.
IS 1971 REPORT ON THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH at 51.
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previously had only an office audit staff.19 The field audit staff concen-
trated largely on the sales and use tax. This augmented audit activity
caused an increase in the number of disputes and, eventually, in the
amount of litigation. Subsequently, the Tax Department expanded audit
activity in the corporate income tax area as well, and the number of
disputes in that area also increased. 0 Furthermore, although there is no
empirical data to substantiate it, the feeling among some practitioners
was that the Department became less willing to settle cases by compro-
mise under the new Commissioner.
All of these developments converged to create a need for more regu-
larized dispute settlement procedures. Although the very informal
previous system had apparently satisfied both the Tax Department and
taxpayers, the situation had changed drastically by the mid-1970's. Prac-
titioners perceived an urgent need for improvement in Virginia's pro-
cedures, which led to the formation of a "State Tax Law Revision Task
Force" in 1977. The Task Force was a joint project of the Committees on
Taxation of the Virginia Bar Association, the Virginia State Bar and the
Virginia Society of Certified Public Accountants. The Task Force, which
studied several aspects of the procedural system, focused primarily on
procedures for resolution of disputes and on the need to issue published
regulations.
In December, 1978, the Task Force issued its report." The Task
Force perceived two basic defects in the procedural system: 1) the inade-
quacy of administrative and judicial refund procedures,' and 2) the lack
of published regulations in conjunction with the "great weight" afforded
unpublished interpretations of the Tax Department.' With respect to re-
fund procedures, the Task Force suggested that the Tax Department in-
stitute a more regularized administrative dispute resolution procedure.
The Task Force proposed that disputes which reach the courts be heard
only by certain designated judges to be appointed by the supreme
court.u The Task Force reasoned that, by limiting the hearing of tax
19 The Tax Department added one hundred new auditors. Interview with William H.
Forst, Virginia Tax Commissioner (June 23, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Forst Interview].
20 Id.
n REPORT OF THE STATE TAX LAW REVISION TASK FORCE (Dec. 18, 1978) [hereinafter
referred to as TASK FORCE REPORT].
n Id. at 2.
" Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 13. The Task Force had considered and rejected two other dispute resolution
procedures: 1) creation of a specialized tax court; and 2) designation of specific courts to
hear all appeals from Tax Commissioner determinations. It rejected these alternatives
because:
[T]he Joint Task Force does not believe there is sufficient tax refund litiga-
tion to merit the expense of creating a separate tax court. The second alternative
was seriously considered by the Joint Task Force and has the Joint Task Force's
support. The only reason such a provision is not incorporated in the Joint Task
Force's recommended statutes is that a similar proposal (House Bill 579 (1972))
1981] 1119
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cases to a certain few circuit judges, those judges would become expert
in the tax law. Eventually, this proposal would result in those judges
constituting a de facto tax court. The Task Force's other major recom-
mendation was to limit the "great weight" doctrine for the Commis-
sioner's administrative interpretations to those which had been published
in a regulation of which the public had notice and the opportunity to
comment."
In the wake of the Task Force Report, the General Assembly created
the "Practice and Procedures in the Collection of State Taxes Study
Committee" to consider its recommendations." The Study Committee
met several times during 1979, and issued a report in early 1980.1 The
Study Committee originally focused on the problem of a lack of published
regulations. During the course of the Study Committee's deliberations,
however, the Tax Commissioner issued a response to the Task Force
Report in which he suggested that the legislature create an independent
Board of Tax Appeals.' The response detailed the proposal as follows:
[A]s an alternative to the task force proposal the Department
of Taxation recommends adding another step to the administra-
tive process in the form of a Virginia Board of Tax Appeals. The
members of the Board would be completely independent of the
Department of Taxation- actually appointed by the Governor.
The Board would hear and determine appeals from final rulings
from the Department of Taxation. The Department proposes that
Board hearings be public and that all proceedings before the
Board be officially reported and all records of proceedings be ju-
dicial records. Decisions of the Board would be subject to judicial
review.29
The Study Committee considered, and ultimately accepted, Commis-
sioner Forst's proposed independent Board of Tax Appeals."
House Bill 990, which was designed to implement the Study Commit-
tee's recommendations, was introduced in the General Assembly on
was previously considered and rejected by the General Assembly. The Joint Task
Force, however, believes that allowing appeals only to certain circuit courts would
produce many of the same benefits as a system whereby the trial judge in tax
cases is designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 2.
= See H.J. Res. 342 (1979).
REPORT OF THE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES IN THE COLLECTION AND ADMINISTRATION
OF STATE TAXES STUDY COMMITTEE, H. Doc. No. 30 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as STUDY
COMMITTEE REPORT].
" DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION'S RESPONSE TO THE "REPORT OF THE STATE TAX LAW REVI-
SION TASK FORCE" 9-10 (1979) [hereinafter cited as RESPONSE TO TASK FORCE REPORT].
Id at 9.
Minutes of Study Committee (September 27, 1979), at 7-12; Minutes of Study Com-
mittee (October 15, 1979), at 7-11.
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February 4, 1980. One provision of the Bill precluded the Commissioner
from depending upon administrative interpretations in litigation unless
the interpretations had been published in the form of a regulation pro-
mulgated in accordance with the Administrative Process Act." The Bill
also contained a provision creating a Board of Tax Appeals, as suggested
by Commissioner Forst. In addition to these proposals, the Study Com-
mittee recommended that the General Assembly revise the statute of
limitations.3 2 Finally,- the Study Committee recommended that the
General Assembly repeal the Commissioner's automatic right to a re-
hearing within six months after a circuit court decision, ' and add defini-
tions to the code to clarify its standing and limitations provisions."
In the course of hearings by the House Finance Committee, various
members of that Committee raised objections to the proposed Board of
Tax Appeals. Consequently, the House Finance Committee deleted that
part of the legislation. The General Assembly enacted most of the Study
Committee's remaining recommendations. Most significantly, it enacted
the proposed provision requiring publication of comprehensive regula-
tions." The Act substantially rewrote Chapter 22 of Title 58 of the
Virginia Code, and constituted a momentous improvement in Virginia
tax procedures. The General Assembly failed, however, to deal with the
fundamental nature of the tax appeals process: the unfinished business.
II. Current Tax Appeals Procedure in Virginia
The basic law governing tax appeals appears in Chapter 22 of Title 58
of the Virginia Code. In typical case involving a tax administered by the
Department of Taxation, 8 the taxpayer's first contact with the state will
' Virginia Administrative Process Act, VA. CODE § 9-6.14:1 to :21 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
'2 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 27, at 7. The Study Committee's recommended
revisions of the statute of limitations were as follows: 1) give the taxpayer a three year
statute of limitations from the date of mailing of notice of assessment to contest it either
before the Tax Commissioner or the courts; 2) allow a taxpayer to file a protective claim for
a refund which extends the limitations period to one year beyond the date the Commis-
sioner makes a decision on the claim; and 3) make the limitations period run three years
from the date the tax was due or paid (whichever is later) rather than from the December 31
after that date.
Id.
* Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
1980 Va. Acts ch. 633. In addition, the General Assembly reduced the time in which
the Commissioner could exercise his automatic rehearing right from six months to twenty-
one days from the time the circuit court order is certified to the Commissioner by the clerk.
See VA. CODE § 58-1137 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The General Assembly also enacted the Study
Committee's basic recommendations with respect to standing and limitations. See id. §§
58-441.38, -1117.20.
6VA. CODE § 58-1117.20(4) (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides:
"Tax administered by the Department of Taxation" shall include the State and
local recordation and probate taxes, the writ tax, the income tax including the
withholding and estimated taxes, the inheritance and gift taxes, the estate tax,
1981] 1121
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be through an auditor examining his records. The auditor will issue a
report and review it with the taxpayer. If the taxpayer disagrees with
the report, he can request a review by the auditor's supervisor. Normally,
the supervisor will not change a report unless there is a clear error. The
report then goes to the Field Services Division of the Tax Department
which reviews the audit. There sometimes may be lengthy correspond-
ence between the Field Services Division and the taxpayer at this stage.
If the taxpayer and the Division still do not agree, the Division will issue
an assessment for any amount of additional tax which it deems the tax-
payer owes the commonwealth. At this point, the taxpayer may file,
within 90 days, an application with the Commissioner for correction of
the assessment. 7 The Tax Department may not collect the tax after it
has been notified by the taxpayer of his intent to file such an appli-
cation. 8
Once the taxpayer files his application for correction of the tax
assessment, the Commissioner is further stayed from collecting the tax
until he has made a final determination concerning the correctness of the
assessment. 9 Following the application, there may be informal contact
between the taxpayer and the Department, and ultimately the Commis-
sioner or his delegate may hold a hearing" on the taxpayer's application. 1
This hearing is a relatively informal proceeding held at Tax Department
Headquarters in Richmond at which the taxpayer has full opportunity to
present his arguments.2 The taxpayer may or may not be represented
by counsel at the hearing. Various personnel from within the Tax
Department may be present. Normally, a representative of the relevant
the State license taxes, the State tax on intangible personal property, the State
and local sales and use taxes, the State and local bank stock and bank franchise
taxes, the State tobacco tax, the aircraft sales and use tax, the forest products
tax, the egg promotion tax, the peanut excise tax, the slaughter hog and feeder
pig tax, the soybean tax, the litter tax, the soft drink excise tax and the malt
beverages tax.
This article does not consider appeals concerning taxes administered by the State Corpora-
tion Commission which has both administrative and judicial powers and, accordingly,
handles its own tax appeals. See id. § 58-1122 to -1129 (Repl. Vol. 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
- Id § 58-1118.
Id. Upon receipt of notice of intent to file an application for correction of an assess-
ment, the Commissioner must refrain from collecting the tax until the time for filing has ex-
pired, unless he determines that collection is in jeopardy. Id.
I& § 58-1119.
,0 There are no published regulations governing hearing procedures. The following
description of hearing procedures summarizes interviews with Tax Department personnel
and tax practitioners who have been involved in the process.
" A hearing is not necessary in order to obtain a formal ruling from the Commissioner.
The current practice of the Department is to issue formal rulings for erroneous assessment
appeals "as a result of correspondence without a hearing or an informal hearing at the re-
quest of the taxpayer or just a letter of application." Minutes of Study Committee (June 26,
1979), at 10.
2 Because the facts are not in dispute in the majority of cases, the issues generally in-
volve application of law to uncontested facts. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 6.
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operating division will attend, along with a member of the Tax Policy
Division, which has responsibility for the hearing and appeal process
within the Department. The Commissioner usually is present at these
hearings also. The form of the taxpayer's application for correction of
the tax assessment varies from case to case. The application may be a
relatively informal and brief document or it may be the equivalent of a
legal memorandum or brief. Following the hearing, the Commissioner
issues a decision in which he either upholds the Department's assess-
ment or overturns it and determines the proper amount of tax due.
After the decision, the Department will usually collect the tax promptly,
since the statute authorizes collection after the Commissioner has made
his final determination.43
Upon the Commissioner's adverse determination, the taxpayer has
the option to apply to a local circuit court for correction of the assess-
ment.4 The Department of Taxation is the named defendant in such a
case, and the proceeding is treated as an action at law, subject to the
Rules of Court."5 The taxpayer has no right to petition the circuit court
unless he has paid the full amount of the tax alleged to be due." Since
the action in the circuit court is de novo, the taxpayer and the Commis-
sioner must again present the complete case to the court, rather than
merely presenting a record of the Tax Department hearing."'
To bring suit in local circuit court, a taxpayer need not first have ex-
hausted his administrative remedy of a departmental hearing. A tax-
payer may, at his option, forego application to the Commissioner for cor-
rection of an erroneous assessment, and proceed directly to the circuit
court. If the taxpayer chooses this option, however, he will have to pay
the assessed tax soon after the assessment. The Commissioner will not
be prohibited from collecting the tax in the absence of an application to
the Commissioner for correction of an erroneous assessment, 8 and pay-
ment of the tax is a prerequisite to the circuit court action. 9
If a taxpayer elects to apply for an administrative determination
prior to bringing suit in local circuit court, he should be wary of a poten-
tial procedural pitfall. The statute of limitations for proceeding in the
circuit court continues to run even after the taxpayer has filed the ad-
ministrative application. There is no provision which tolls the statute
upon the filing of the application.' The statute does provide, however,
that a taxpayer who has paid an assessment may preserve his right to
proceed in the circuit court by filing a protective claim for a refund with
VA. CODE § 58-1119 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
" Id § 58-1130.
4Id
Id
Usually, a record of the Tax Department hearing would not even be made.
Id §§ 58-1118 to -1119.
" Id. § 58-1130.
VA. CODE § 58-1130 (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides that the statute of limitations runs
three years from the date of assessment of the tax.
19811 1123
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the Commissioner.51 This extends the time limitation to the end of one
year after the date of the Commissioner's decision on such refund claim.
Alternatively, the Commissioner and the taxpayer may agree on a
waiver of the statute of limitations.2
If a circuit court issues a decision adverse to the Tax Commissioner,
he has the right to file a petition for a rehearing. He must file the rehear-
ing petition within twenty-one days from the time the court's order is
certified by the clerk to the Commissioner.5 The Commissioner's right
to a rehearing has been criticized by some on the ground that the tax-
payer has no similar right to a rehearing." The Commissioner's rehear-
ing right is apparently an historical remnant from the prior practice
under which the Tax Department was not a party to the taxpayer's cir-
cuit court action, and the commonwealth's interests were represented
by the local Commonwealth's Attorney. The rehearing gave the Commis-
sioner an opportunity to present his arguments, thereby facilitating his
oversight of commonwealth tax law.55 Once the circuit court's decision is
final, either the taxpayer or the Commissioner may appeal it to the
Supreme Court.5
In addition to these procedures, a taxpayer may file an amended
return in order to claim a refund. 7 The statute also authorizes the Tax
Commissioner to take the initiative in correcting an erroneous assess-
ment.' One old and obscure case recognized the possibility of a taxpayer
bringing an action in assumpsit for refund of taxes paid under compul-
sion. 9 The General Assembly has, however, generally precluded tax-
payers from obtaining injunctive relief against the assessment or collec-
tion of taxes."0
Local tax procedures follow the same basic pattern as state proce-
dures." When a taxpayer contests a property tax assessment, his reme-
1 Id- § 58-1119.1.
VA. CODE § 8.01-235 (Repl. Vol. 1974) provides that the statute of limitations is an af-
firmative defense and is no longer jurisdictional in the case of purely statutory remedies
such as the § 58-1130 application for correction of an erroneous assessment. See also Com-
monwealth v. Columbian Paper Co., 143 Va. 332, 130 S.E. 421 (1925).
' VA. CODE § 58-1137 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
" See STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 27, at 7; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
21, at 28-29. Both reports recommended abolition of the Commissioner's right to a rehear-
ing. Id.
. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 28-29 (calling the rehearing an
"anachronism").
VA. CODE § 58-1138 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
Id. § 58-1118.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
Id § 58-1153 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
12 Charlottesville v. Marks' Shows Inc., 179 Va. 321, 18 S.E.2d 890 (1942). The court
denied the taxpayer relief, however, on the ground that merely stating that payment was
made "under protest" did not amount to paying under compulsion. Id at 332-34, 18 S.E.2d at
896-97.
' VA. CODE § 58-1158 (Repl. Vol. 1974); see Davis, supra note 4, at 132-33.
" For a more comprehensive treatment of procedures in cases involving local property
taxes, see Property Taxation in Virginia, supra note 4, at 646-49.
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dies consist of a hearing before the assessing body"2 and a hearing by a
local Board of Equalization appointed by the circuit court.' The taxpayer
or the locality may appeal a decision by the Board of Equalization to the
local circuit court or city court of record." As with state taxes, there is
no requirement that the taxpayer exhaust his administrative remedies
and the court proceeding is de novo.65 Thus, the taxpayer is not required
to appeal before either the assessing body or the Board of Equalization
prior to filing the court application. There is no provision, however, for
delaying collection of the disputed tax while the taxpayer is pursuing his
remedies. While there also is no specific code provision for an appeal to
the supreme court from the local court, such appeals have been allowed
in the case of both the taxpayer and the taxing authority. 6
In summary, the taxpayer has informal administrative remedies
available at both the commonwealth and local level, along with a formal
application to a court *for correction of an erroneous assessment.
Although a further appeal to the supreme court is also available, few
taxpayers reach that stage.7 Furthermore, it usually would be wor-
thwhile for a taxpayer to pursue the judicial remedies only in cases
where there are substantial amounts involved. Therefore, most of the ac-
tivity with respect to disputes procedures probably takes place at the
administrative level on an informal basis.
III. Critique of Current Procedures
The 1980 legislation, especially its requirement that the Tax Depart-
ment publish comprehensive regulations, accomplished substantial
improvement in Virginia tax procedures." The dispute resolution proce-
dures themselves, however, remain substantially unchanged.
On the positive side, Virginia's current system for administrative
review is flexible and allows taxpayers easy access to Tax Department
officials. The administrative procedures are informal and often do not re-
quire that the taxpayer be represented by counsel. These procedures
reduce the taxpayer's cost of contesting an assessment at the adminis-
trative level, and allow a desirable degree of give and take between the
Department and the taxpayer in resolving disputes. Moreover, the infor-
mal administrative procedures enable the parties to fully air the issues,
cull out the irrelevant ones, and focus their attention -and the later at-
" VA. CODE § 58-792.01 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
SId § 58-776.4; §§ 58-895 to -914 (Repl. Vol. 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
"Id. § 58-776.4 (Cum. Supp. 1981); § 58-907 (Repl. Vol. 1974); § 58-1145 (Cum. Supp.
1981).
" See text accompanying notes 44-49 supra.
See, e.g., Smith v. City of Covington, 205 Va. 104, 135 S.E.2d 220 (1964) (taxpayer);
Commonwealth v. Schmelz, 116 Va. 62, 81 S.E. 45 (1914) (taxing authority).
67 Only 85 commonwealth and local tax cases involving § 58-1130 or § 58-1145 applica-
tions were reported by the Virginia Supreme Court between 1945 and 1980. See note 12
supra.
"See VA. CODE § 58-48.6 to .8 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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tention of a court-on the more relevant issues. Apparently, the Tax De-
partment and the taxpayer are abie to agree to a statement of facts in
most instances so that only the legal issues are contested. 9 Coupled with
the extremely flexible administrative procedures and the easy availability
and helpfulness of Tax Department personnel to taxpayer represen-
tatives,7 it is obvious that these aspects of the system should be main-
tained.
Nevertheless, the ultimate decision at the administrative level is
made by the Tax Commissioner, who is also the officer charged with en-
forcement. Such a combination of enforcement and adjudication func-
tions in the same office is normally undesirable.7 1 It is most difficult for
anyone to be both prosecutor and judge, and, even if it were possible for
one to combine these functions satisfactorily, the appearance of impar-
tiality on the part of the decision-maker is severely compromised. The
appearance of impartiality is important from the standpoint of taxpayer
confidence in the system and remains so, even if in fact the combination
of these conflicting functions results in no unfairness. 2 Therefore, even
given the desirability of retaining the present administrative appeal pro-
cedure, there remains a need for review by an impartial, independent
body at some stage.
If the taxpayer elects to pursue the judicial remedy for correction of
an erroneous assessment, he has the advantage of appearing in a local
court. The taxpayer is subject to less expense than if he had to appear in
a distant place, and is permitted to wage the judicial contest in more
familiar surroundings. Some taxpayers believe that they receive better
treatment at the hands of the local court than they would in a distant
one.78 However, the judicial proceeding has more numerous, and perhaps
more serious, problems than the administrative proceeding. First,
before a taxpayer may apply to a court for correction of an erroneous
6 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 6.
See Minutes of Study Committee (June 26, 1979), at 5.
71 See Kray, California Tax Court. An Approach to Progressive Tax Administration,
37 S. CAL. L. REV. 485, 488 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Kray]; Hellerstein, Judicial Review of
Property Tax Assessments, 14 TAx L. REV. 327, 349 (1959). Tax Commissioner Forst has
recognized the desirability of separating the enforcement and adjudication functions:
[Mr. Forst] noted one of the points made today was that a taxpayer should not
pursue an administrative appeal before the person making the ruling being ap-
pealed. He felt there should be- another body to hear the administrative appeal to
determine impartially whether the Department has interpreted the law or their
regulations correctly.
Minutes of Study Committee (September 27, 1979), at 7; see also Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (1977).
n "[Tihat the public believe justice is done is no less important than that it be done
with the greatest possible precision." Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REV.
698, 701-02 (1913).
" Taxpayers' preference for a local court was a factor in the Study Committee's
deliberations. As Mr. Rowe noted, "[Miany people refuse to give up the right to sue before
'their judge in their local circuit court."' Minutes of Study Committee (June 26, 1979), at 9.
[Vol. XXXVIII
VIRGINIA TAX PROCEDURES
assessment, the taxpayer must pay the tax alleged to be due.74 There-
fore, unlike the federal dispute process, there is no opportunity for the
Virginia taxpayer to contest the tax before an independent, impartial
forum prior to having to pay the amount in dispute. The Virginia proce-
dure can present a substantial hardship to a taxpayer suddenly faced
with an assessment, especially in the case of smaller businessmen. The
tax collector already begins any dispute with a substantial advantage: in
the tax law, the taxpayer is presumed guilty until he proves himself in-
nocent."5 It does not seem fair or even necessary in most cases to add to
this advantage the power to require payment of the tax prior to adjudi-
cation before an independent tribunal.
Cases which reach the judicial level are spread out over thirty-one
different circuit courts throughout the commonwealth. 8 The circuit
courts publish few written opinions, and the individual courts operate on
a fairly independent basis. This judicial self-reliance contributes to a lack
of consistency in decision-making among the circuits. Additionally, be-
cause of the fact that there are few written opinions, a body of law and
precedent has not been established. The 1980 reforms, which require the
Commissioner to publish all orders and written opinions by the circuit
courts in commonwealth tax cases,7 may alleviate this problem to some
extent. The 1980 reforms, however, will not entirely eliminate the incon-
sistency problem, just as it has not been eliminated at the federal level
where appeals from the United States Tax Court are also spread out
over several circuits. Moreover, the publication requirement applies only
to commonwealth tax cases, so that the problem remains unabated with
respect to local tax cases.
The current tax appeals procedures in Virginia also present an op-
portunity for forum shopping by taxpayers in commonwealth tax cases. 8
For example, a trade association may finance a court challenge to a par-
ticular Tax Department policy by singling out a test case which involves
only one of its member taxpayers. This gives the association the oppor-
tunity to pick the best case and the most favorable forum in which to
contest the policy. In order to avoid inconsistency among circuits, the
Tax Department-then has to treat itself as bound by the decision in that
particular case, or in the alternative, be forced into a position of applying
"' VA. CODE § 58-1130 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
" See, e.g., d. § 58-48.8(A), § 58-1130; Department of Taxation v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,
217 Va. 121, 225 S.E.2d 870 (1976); Union Tanning Co. v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 610, 96 S.E.
780 (1918).
78 1980 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH at 150-57.
" VA. CODE § 58-48.7(3) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
,' VA. CODE § 8.01-261(13b) (Cum. Supp. 1981) controls the venue in actions for correc-
tion of erroneous assessment under VA. CODE § 58-1130 (Cum. Supp. 1981). It provides for
venue in any one of the counties or cities: "(1) Wherein the taxpayer resides; (2) Wherein the
taxpayer has a registered office, or regularly or systematically conducts business; (3)
Wherein the taxpayer's real or personal property involved in such a proceeding is located;
(4) The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond." Id § 8.01-261(13b).
1981] 1127
1128 WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
one policy in that particular jurisdiction and another policy throughout
the rest of the commonwealth.7 9 The present system, therefore, pro-
motes a lack of a uniform statewide tax policy which presents con-
siderable difficulties of administration. The Governor's Commission on
Reform of the Property Tax System recognized this problem back in
1974:
[T]he results of cases on different facts and in different courts
are often impossible to apply consistently to taxpayers all over
the State. Even where there is no direct conflict in the inter-
pretation of a single set of facts, there are completely different
points of'view and emphases. In order to derive some consistency
the Department is forced to appeal any case which it is unable to
apply consistently to all taxpayers, or unable to live with, re-
gardless of its monetary significance. As it would be unfair for
the Department to settle any case in which a general principle
applicable to many taxpayers is involved, this present system is
unduly burdensome both to the taxpayer and the Department;
the taxpayer contemplating court action must be prepared to go
all the way to the Supreme Court, and the Department must
spend untold hours on cases involving miniscule sums."
Furthermore, because any given circuit judge is unlikely to have a
substantial number of tax cases, the opportunities for circuit judges to
develop expertise in the tax area are extremely limited. This situation
leads to unnecessary and avoidable effort on the part of attorneys in
educating the judges and on the part of the judges in educating them-
selves in tax cases. There are presently 114 circuit judgeships in
Virginia." With the cases spread out among so many judges, it is obvious
that the opportunities for any given judge to develop tax expertise are
extremely limited.2
The problem is aggravated by the fact that the subject of state and
local taxation historically has been neglected by most law schools. Some
constitutional law courses may contain a smattering of state and local
tax material when considering the commerce clause. Few law schools,
however, devote any substantial resources to a discrete course in state
and local taxation." Most attorneys and circuit judges, therefore,
" GOVERNOR'S PROPERTY TAX REFORM STUDY, REFORMING THE VIRGINIA PROPERTY TAX,
VOLUME II, at 124-125 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as PROPERTY TAX REFORM STUDY].
MIc at 124.
81 1980 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH at 150-57.
2See PROPERTY TAX REFORM STUDY, supra note 79, at 124: "As there are no specialized
courts ... it is necessary to provide a complete education in tax for each judge who tries a
tax case. As only a tiny portion of any circuit court's business is tax litigation, it is
understandable that most judges are not well versed in the law."
0 The DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1980-81 (West) lists only 17 full-time pro-
fessors currently teaching state and local taxation who have over five years experience in
doing so. Even at schools which do teach this subject, it is often an ignored elective.
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graduate from law school with little, if any, knowledge of state and local
taxation.
Another criticism of the current tax appeals procedures in Virginia
is that the formality of circuit court proceedings make it expensive for a
taxpayer to dispute an assessment. In situations where the assessment
is not large, the circuit court proceeding is probably too expensive, leav-
ing the taxpayer with no independent tribunal to consider his case.
Finally, with the increased audit activity that has occurred over the past
ten years, more taxpayers have been brought into the enforcement
mechanism, and it is inevitable that smaller claims will increase in
number."' Some means must be devised to take account of this phenome-
non.
The same kinds of criticism can be made with respect to local tax
procedures, specifically the property tax. Local tax procedures provide a
mechanism for administrative appeal by means of an objection to the
assessing officer or body and also to a Board of Equalization.85 However,
appeals from the Board of Equalization" are subject to the same basic
defects as procedures at the commonwealth tax level regarding lack of
expertise, inconsistency, and formalism.
Virginia tax procedures can therefore be characterized as flexible,
informal, and expensive at the administrative level. Additionally, in the
case of commonwealth taxes, the administrative procedure incorrectly
assigns both enforcement and decision-making responsibilities to the
Virginia Tax Commissioner. The Boards of Equalization for property
taxes are not subject to this objection, and they may be developing suffi-
cient expertise on account of the requirement, first enacted in 1975, that
they receive education in assessment practices through the State Tax
Commissioner." On the judicial level, however, the system is subject to
the objections that it is formal, expensive, has not established a body of
precedent, and leads to inconsistent results and policies statewide. A
further significant defect of the current Virginia tax procedure is its re-
quirement that taxpayers pay the tax alleged to be due prior to contest-
ing the assessment. Finally, the current system does not facilitate the
development of expertise on the part of the judges, permits forum shop-
ping by taxpayers, and is wasteful of the resources of the taxpayers, the
Tax Department, and the judiciary.
IV. A Proposed Virginia Board of Tax Appeals
A. Desirability of a Board of Tax Appeals
Taxpayers want and deserve a fair, efficient, convenient, and inex-
pensive means of disputing tax assessments. The best way to accomplish
" See Minutes of Study Committee (June 26, 1979), at 1 (noting that more "small" tax-
payers are challenging assessments).
VA. CODE § 58-792.01; § 58-895 to -914 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
See id. § 58-907 (Repl. Vol. 1974); § 58-1145 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
Id. § 58-33.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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this goal is to institute a statewide independent tax adjudication body.
As long ago as 1974, the Governor's Commission on Reform of the Prop-
erty Tax System recognized the desirability of such an entity:
While the study on which this report is based is not concerned
with tax matters other than property tax assessments, attention
is directed to the absence of machinery for administrative ap-
peals in other forms of taxation. It is suggested that, in conjunc-
tion with the establishment of a state appellate agency to hear
appeals on matters of property assessments, consideration be
given to giving it jurisdiction over appeals in other categories of
tax matters. 8
The creation of a Board of Tax Appeals was also one of the major recom-
mendations of the Study Committee."9 While the Task Force turned
down the idea of a separate Tax Court or Board of Tax Appeals, it did
recommend the designation of specific circuit court judges to hear tax
cases, a procedure which, if put into effect, would have resulted in a de
facto tax court." All three of these studies have concluded that vesting
sole jurisdiction in tax cases in the local circuit court is inadequate, and
two have specifically recommended creation of a Board of Tax Appeals.
Nevertheless, the idea has not found its way into enactment. The opinion
has been expressed that House Bill 990 embodied changes too dramatic
to be accomplished in one year. 1 Since the Study Committee apparently
believed the requirement for publication of regulations was the most im-
portant and pressing aspect of that legislation, the proposal for a Board
of Tax Appeals was quietly dropped.2 However, many of the same defects
in the system which led to the prior proposals remain today.
Most of the remaining criticisms of the Virginia tax dispute resolu-
tion process could be answered by the creation of an independent tax ad-
judication body. This body might be either a full-blown court that is part
of the judicial system, or an independent agency in the executive
branch. In whichever form, an independent tax adjudication body
PROPERTY TAX REFORM STUDY, supra note 79, at 106; see also id. at 123-25.
STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 27, at 6.
0 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 7-8.
91 Forst Interview, supra note 19.
92 Id
" A 1978 study by the Federation of Tax Administrators indicated that as of that time
two states, Oregon and Hawaii, and the District of Columbia had created a tax court as part
of the judiciary. FEDERATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATORS, STATE TAX REVIEW AGENCIES:
ORGANIZATIONS AND PRACTICES 4 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as FTA REPORT]. Since then,
New Jersey has abandoned its board of tax appeals and created a tax court. N.J. STAT. ANN.
2A:3A1-15 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (West). Twenty states-Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, and
Wisconsin-had independent boards of tax appeals. FTA REPORT, supra, at 10. Another 11
states-Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas and West Virginia-had set up specialized divisions within
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would present several improvements in current policy. First, the Board
would hear only tax cases and, unlike the present situation with respect
to circuit courts, would be able to build up a considerable expertise in
the commonwealth and local tax area. Because all their cases would in-
volve tax matters, the members of the Board would quickly develop pro-
ficiency in the subject. This tax expertise would result in better, and
more expeditious, decisions. This would also eliminate the waste of
resources which now occurs.
Second, under the proposal, tax appeals would be decided by one en-
tity, instead of being spread out to all of the different circuits. This
would lead to more consistent decision-making since decisions would
come from the same source and have effect statewide. This would result
in more uniform statewide tax policy. A closely related benefit of- an in-
dependent tax appeals procedure is the opportunity which the Board
would have to build up a substantial body of precedent. Currently, few
written decisions emanate from the circuit courts." A Board of Tax Ap-
peals, however, if required to write findings of fact and conclusions of
law for each decision, would soon build up a body of case law precedent
which would be invaluable to practitioners.
Third, a statewide Board of Tax Appeals, if given exclusive jurisdic-
tion in tax cases, would eliminate the opportunity for forum shopping
currently available to taxpayers. The Board would further promote
uniform application of the law to all taxpayers, and eliminate the current
advantage of taxpayers with the resources to engage in this practice.
Fourth, a Board of Tax Appeals, if given authority to institute a
small claims procedure, would provide a forum for a convenient, infor-
mal, and impartial hearing to taxpayers in small disputes. Under present
procedures the only informal hearing is within the Tax Department
itself, and this procedure ultimately cannot be wholly impartial since the
adjudication and enforcement functions are not separated.
Fifth, although it is not a unique feature of a Board of Tax Appeals, a
Board's procedures could be set up to eliminate the current requirement
that the taxpayer pay the assessment prior to contesting it before an in-
dependent tribunal. A taxpayer would not be forced, as now, to part
their tax enforcement agencies which are charged with the specific function of ad-
ministrative review. Id at 32. Four states-California, Nevada, New York, and Wyo-
ming-had hybrid systems. IML at 2. These involve appeals to other state agencies which dif-
fer from a board of tax appeals or tax court in that the agency also has administrative duties
with respect to the tax system in addition to deciding tax appeals. That is, their principal
statutory functions are other than review of tax cases. The remainder of the states, among
them Virginia, had neither a tax court, an independent board of tax appeals, nor any
prescribed specialized review procedures within the tax collecting agency itself.
" The 1980 legislation requires circuit court decisions to be published by the Tax Com-
missioner. VA. CODE § 58-48.7(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1981); see text accompanying note 77 supra.
However, there is no requirement that a circuit court decision contain a written opinion.
See VA. CODE § 58-48.7(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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with his money prior to an independent adjudication that he really owes
it. The opening of the taxpayer's purse would no longer be subject to the
unreviewed decision of the tax administrator. Finally, all of these five
factors would result in promoting the "image of justice" among taxpayers
by providing the kind of expert, impartial, and convenient forum that
they perceive to be truly capable of giving them a fair opportunity to
contest tax assessments.
Nevertheless, several objections have been raised to the creation of
a Board of Tax Appeals in Virginia. Most of these objections were voiced
in opposition to the Board of Tax Appeals proposed under House Bill 990
in 1980."5 The first objection was that a Board of Tax Appeals would
become a special interest entity, catering to tax practitioners and
denigrating the State Tax Commissioner's authority. This objection was
apparently raised because the idea for a Board of Tax Appeals was
perceived by some as emanating from the tax bar and accountants through
the Joint Task Force. In fact, however, the Board of Tax Appeals was
suggested to the Study Committee by the Tax Commissioner." While it
is true that tax practitioners have a strong interest in the occurrence of
some kind of dispute resolution reform, taxpayers have an even stronger
interest in it. Moreover, to turn down the idea on the ground that
lawyers would then be running the system is similar to arguing there
should not be an independent judiciary because, after all, judges are
usually lawyers. Perhaps this argument can best be explained as stem-
ming from a basic mistrust of attorneys held by many laymen.
A second objection to the Board of Tax Appeals was that there
would not be a large enough case load for such a board to merit its crea-
tion. The answer to this argument is that presently there are eighty-five
cases pending in the Tax Department, and twenty-five cases before the
circuit courts involving appeals from commonwealth taxes .7 There are
enough cases to require the part-time employment of three Assistant At-
torneys General assigned to the Tax Department. 8 Furthermore, if the
Board of Tax Appeals' jurisdiction was to include property tax cases, the
case load would at least double in number. A recent study indicates that,
in states having boards of tax appeals or tax courts which include prop-
erty tax appeals in their jurisdiction, property tax cases usually make up
" This summary concerning objections raised to the proposed Board of Tax Appeals
was gleaned from interviews with Tax Commissioner Forst, Mr. E.A. Dore, Director of Tax
Policy Division, Department of Taxation, and Mr. William L.S. Rowe. Commissioner Forst
and Mr. Rowe were both members of the Study Committee.
11 RESPONSE TO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 9; see text accompanying notes
28-29 supra.
' Letter from E.A. Dore, Director of Tax Policy Division, Department of Taxation, to
Author (September 21, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Dore Letter]. These totals do not, of
course, take into account any backlog effect caused by cases pending for a long period of
time.
. Forst Interview, supra note 19.
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the majority of cases heard." This certainly would be true in Virginia,
since the commonwealth currently requires property revaluations at
periodic intervals."'0 Additionally, the very existence of an independent
board would encourage taxpayers who might otherwise concede an
assessment to file an appeal. Some persons might find increased litiga-
tion an undesirable result. However, if tax litigation is kept down merely
because of the lack of a convenient forum, it could hardly be said that
taxpayers are receiving fair treatment.
Even if the case load were insufficient for a full-time Board of Tax
Appeals, a part-time board could be effectively utilized. Several states,
including Virginia's neighbors-Maryland, Kentucky, and North Caro-
lina-utilize part-time boards.1' The most difficult problem posed by a
part-time Board of Tax Appeals is the potential conflicts of interest by
the Board members who are also tax practitioners. This is a perplexing
problem, and there may be no completely satisfactory solution. One
answer might be to choose the Board from among persons not engaged
in tax practice."' 2 As a consequence, members initially would lack the ex-
pertise advanced as one of the principal advantages of a Board of Tax
Appeals. However, this inexperience would probably be overcome within
a fairly short time. Presumably, it would be possible to prohibit
members to engage in tax practice while on the Board. In the event that
tax practitioners were selected, it would of course be necessary* to pro-
hibit any member from hearing a case in which he or any member of his
firm was involved. Ultimately, it would necessarily depend upon the
discretion and honor of the Board members to avoid even the ap-
pearance of impropriety. 3 Of course, the most obvious solution is simply
to have a full-time Board.
The third and final objection to the creation of a full-time Board of
Tax Appeals was simply that it would not be worth the expense. This ob-
jection is closely related to the case load argument. It basically rests on
the premise that, given the presumed current public opinion favoring a
reduction in the size of government, the present is not an appropriate
time to create a new agency. Obviously, this is a matter upon which
reasonable people can differ. However, by relieving the circuit courts of
the burden of hearing tax cases, the creation of a full-time Board of Tax
Appeals would eliminate the waste of resources in the present system.
The Board would provide a forum in which the adjudicators have suffici-
ent expertise to eliminate the necessity of educating a judge anew in
each case. Furthermore, the cost of a Board might not be excessive. Hav-
ing one full-time Board member would be roughly equivalent in salary
"FTA REPORT, Supra note 92, at 24.
1 See VA. CODE § 58-776 to -778.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
"' FTA REPORT, supra note 92, at 14.
12 Forst Interview, supra note 19.
13 Cf. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon Nine.
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cost to adding one circuit judge. House Bill 990, which proposed a part-
time Board composed of three members, set a salary of $14,000 for the
Chairman of the Board, and salaries of $12,000 each for the other two
members.04 The Bill projected a first year cost of $131,300 and a second
year cost of $116,530 for the Board.0 5 It is, of course, a political judgment
whether that amount of cost would be worth the undisputed improve-
ment which the Board would bring about. However, it can hardly be
asserted that a cost of around $130,000 a year to resolve disputes in a
system which brings in over two billion dollars at the state level' and
over 1.4 billion dollars at the local level 7 is inordinant, especially since
the Board would bring about a more efficient, accessible, and speedier
procedure than currently exists. The ultimate question is whether the
interests of fairness and equity to taxpayers in Virginia justify such an
expenditure. The question answers itself.
B. Characteristics of a Board of Tax Appeals
Once the need to create an independent tax adjudication body is set-
tled, several further decisions must be made regarding the structure of
that body. Initially, it must be decided whether to create a tax court that
is a full-fledged part of the judicial branch or whether to create a Board
of Tax Appeals that is an independent agency within the executive
branch.
Only three states-Hawaii, Oregon, and New Jersey-and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have so far opted for a state tax court which is part of
the judicial system.' The original Model State Tax Court Act promul-
gated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws created a tax adjudication agency denominated a "tax court" in
section one of the Act.' Although it was apparently intended to be part
of the judiciary, the judicial status of the "tax court" was nevertheless
left unclear."0 The Revised Model State Court Act explicitly provides
that full judicial status is intended."' In presenting the Revised Act, the
"' House Bill 990 § 3(a) (1980).
"' VIRGINIA DEPT. OF TAXATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1979-1980, at 7.
"I &d at 33 (Table 3.4), 41 (Table 5.2).
108 See note 93 supra.
1 Model State Tax Court Act, 1957 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM-
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 234-39.
"I See id& at 232-33; Commentary on Revised Model State Tax Court Act, 24 TAX LAW.
952 (1971).
"' Revised Model State Tax Court Act § 1, 24 TAX LAW. 947, 947 (1971). The Model
Acts are the result of work by the Committee on State and Local Taxation of the ABA Sec-
tion of Taxation. Over the past several years, the Committee has worked toward adoption
of legislation creating specialized independent tax adjudication bodies by the states. The
Revised Model Act was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates following the 1971 annual
meeting of the ABA. See Report of the Committee on State and Local Taxes, 25 TAX LAW.
622 (1972). Most recently, a Task Force of the Committee on State and Local Taxes recom-
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Committee on State and Local Taxes of the American Bar Association
(ABA) Section on Taxation argued that the court approach was superior
because a court, as compared to an administrative tribunal, would ap-
pear more independent and impartial to the public."' The Committee fur-
ther argued that giving a tax court judicial status would give its judges
enhanced status and regular judicial tenure."' This, in turn, would foster
taxpayer confidence in the efficacy of the tax adjudication process. Finally,
the Committee believed that a true court would eliminate any need for
tax cases to be heard in the regular trial courts of the state, and would
permit direct reviews of tax court decisions by the state's appellate
courts.""
These arguments for placing the independent tax adjudication body
within the judicial branch are not compelling in Virginia's situation.
First, the foreseen elimination of tax cases from circuit court review
could be accomplished just as easily through an administrative Board of
Tax Appeals in the executive branch, if it were considered desirable.
Such a procedure is currently used in appeals in workers' compensation
cases."' Secondly, there is no reason why the General Assembly could
not establish statutory terms for the members of the Board, setting
their terms at whatever number of years the General Assembly deems
appropriate. Thirdly, the accomplishment of public perception of the in-
dependent status of the adjudication body may be achieved through a
proper understanding of the power of semantics. In Minnesota, for ex-
ample, the tax adjudication body is a part of the executive branch. How-
ever, the Minnesota legislature recently enacted legislation designating
a "tax court" to be "an independent agency of the executive branch of
the government," and giving its members the title of "judge."
1 i
An administrative tax Board offers potential advantages which are
not possible with a judicial tax court. For example, a Board might be
able to provide for appearances by persons other than attorneys, such as
certified public accountants, on behalf of taxpayers. Currently, in hear-
ings before the Tax Commissioner, persons other than attorneys may
make appearances on behalf of taxpayers. 7 There is certainly precedent
mended renewed activity encouraging adoption of such legislation by the states. See
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL STATE TAX COURT ACT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION OF THE ABA SECTION OF TAXATION (May 11, 1978).
1 Explanation of Revised Model State Tax Court Act, 24 TAX LAW. 945, 946 (1971).
Id . at 947.
Id at 946:
While most independent quasi-judicial tribunals are equally as impartial, they
do not have the same public confidence as a full fledged court. Since most people
believe that courts protect the citizen, they look to the courts, not to other bodies,
to protect them from improper tax levies. Their expectation of justice is at the
judicial level.
11 VA. CODE § 65.1-94 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
"' 1977 Minn. Laws ch. 307, enacting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 271.01 to .22.
17 Dore Letter, supra note 97. Non-lawyer representation before certain administra-
tive agencies apparently does not constitute unauthorized practice of law in Virginia.
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for permitting persons other than attorneys to appear before a tax ad-
judication body. The United States Tax Court admits persons who are
not attorneys into practice before it upon taking a written examination.118
In addition, an administrative Board rather than a court may facilitate
appointment of nonlawyer members."9 This might be especially desira-
ble if the Board has jurisdiction over property tax valuation cases, since
it would then be possible to appoint an expert in valuation techniques.
Finally, and most important from a practical standpoint, creation of an
administrative Board rather than a court appears to be a less radical
change from the current situation and, therefore, stands a better chance
of legislative acceptance. This may have been an unspoken reason why
Although the Virginia Rules of Court do not directly address the issue, it appears it would
be possible to have non-lawyer representation before the Board of Tax Appeals. The
Virginia Supreme Court has defined the practice of law in part as follows:
Specifically, the relation of attorney and client exists, and one is deemed to be
practicing law, whenever ... (3) One undertakes, with or without compensation, to
represent the interest of another before any tribunal .... otherwise than in the
presentation of facts, figures, or factual conclusions, as distinguished from legal
conclusions...
Va. Rules of Court Part Six, Section I; 216 Va. 1062 (1976) (emphasis added).
In 1976, the Virginia State Bar submitted to the court a proposed Unauthorized Prac-
tice of Law (UPL) Advisory Opinion requesting a crucial definition of the word "tribunal."
The Bar requested that the definition include administrative or executive tribunals, depart-
ments of the executive branch, a state board, a board of tax appeals, an officer or agency
hearing tax appeals under Chapter 22 of Title 58, a board of equalization of real estate
assessments and "any other individual, board or agency charged under the Constitution or
laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia with the responsibility of resolving rights or duties
of a citizen of the Commonwealth." See 28 VA. BAR NEWS, at 42-43 (Aug. 1979).
The Virginia Supreme Court rejected such an extensive definition and stated in
Unauthorized Practice Considerations (UPC) 1-1:
The term "a tribunal, judicial, administrative, or executive, established under the
Constitution or laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia," shall include, in addition
to the courts and judicial officers of Virginia, the State Corporation Commission,
of Virginia and its various divisions, the Industrial Commission of Virginia, and
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. Such term does not include a tribunal
established by virtue of the Constitution or laws of The United States, to the ex-
tent that the regulation of practice before such tribunal has been pre-empted by
federal law.
29 VA. BAR NEWS, at 12 (Aug. 1980).
The court's rejection of the Bar's proposal casts some doubt on the court's desire to
control the practice of law before administrative agencies, and a board or an agency designed
to hear tax appeals that is not a part of the judicial system. See 30 VA. BAR NEWS, at 29
(Aug. 1981). Congress has permitted most of its administrative agencies to determine on
their own the public interest to be served by the admission of non-lawyers to practice
before such agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1976). By rejecting the Bar's proposal, the court
may have felt that a similar rule should be tried in Virginia. See 30 VA. BAR NEWS, at 39
(Aug. 1981).
... United States Tax Court Rule 200(a)(3).
1 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 131.320 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (requiring that two of its Board
members be from "general business"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 209.102 (Cum. Supp. 1980)
(requiring that "[sluch Commissioners shall have had at least 5 years experience in the
assessment or appraisal of real and personal property"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-B: 1
(Supp. 1977) (prohibiting more than one attorney member).
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the Study Committee proposed an administrative Board. No serious con-
sideration of the judicial court concept appears in the Study Committee's
minutes. Apparently, the members simply took it for granted that the
administrative Board was the most desirable route.
Regardless of the foregoing, there is ultimately little need to choose
between a court and an administrative Board in Virginia. In some states,
there are state constitutional limitations which restrain the legislature
from creating a full-fledged judicial tax court, possessing the characteris-
tics concerning judge selection, terms of office, and modes of appeal
thought desirable. 2 0 But, by reason of the broad powers given the
General Assembly with respect to creation of courts by the Virginia Con-
stitution,"' that body has unrestrained power to create a tax court
possessing the characteristics it deems appropriate. The General
Assembly could create a tax court and, by designating it as being other
than a "court of record," provide it with characteristics unconstrained
by the otherwise applicable requirements set forth in the Virginia Con-
stitution. The Virginia Constitution provides that "[t]rial courts of
general jurisdiction, appellate courts, and such other courts as shall be
so designated by the General Assembly shall be known as courts of
record."" Constitutional restrictions with respect to appointment of
judges and their qualifications apply only to courts of record,", and there
is explicit authority for the General Assembly to "provide for additional
judicial personnel, such as judges of courts not of record," and to
"prescribe their jurisdiction and provide the manner in which they shall
be selected and the terms for which they shall serve."
2'
One difference between an administrative Board and a court would
be the power, or lack of power, of the body to formulate its own rules of
procedure. If a court is created, the Virginia Supreme Court would have
authority to make the rules governing its practice and procedures.", By
contrast, an administrative Board of Tax Appeals could be left free to
make its own rules of procedure. Thus, a Board could accomplish the
same basic procedural improvements as could a judicial court. Moreover,
an administrative Board of Tax Appeals may even have some additional
advantages of flexibility in the areas of representation and rules of prac-
tice. Along with the pragmatic consideration that a Board would prob-
12 E.g., ALA. CONST. art. 6, §§ 153-154; ARLz. CONST. art. 6 §§ 12 & 22; COLO. CONST. art.
6, N 11 & 13; FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 8; IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. 6, §§ 12 & 16.
121 VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1:
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Supreme Court and
in such other courts of original or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the
Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from time to time establish.
122 I1&
Id. art. VI, § 7.
' Id. art. VI, § 8.
Article VI, § 5 of the Virginia Constitution states, "[t]he Supreme Court shall have
the authority to make rules governing the course of appeals and the practice and proce-
dures to be used in the courts of the commonwealth..." The provision makes no distinction
between a court of record and a court not of record.
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ably be more acceptable politically, an independent administrative
Board of Tax Appeals would probably be the preferable course in
Virginia.
The next question is whether there should be a full-time or a part-
time Board. The principal advantage of a full-time Board is that it would
largely obviate the conflict of interest problem inherent in a part-time
Board. Given the present potential case load, however, it appears that
there may not be justification for having more than one member of a full-
time Board.'28 This would prevent the diversity that could be achieved
through a multi-member, part-time Board. Oregon currently has one full-
time judge,"2 but does have a provision for appointment of part-time per-
sonnel."8 The Study Committee recommended a part-time Board, ap-
parently on the ground that there was not a sufficient case load to
presently justify even one full-time member."9 This insufficient case
load, along with the diversity of experience and geographical represen-
tation which a part-time Board would permit, most likely overcomes the
objection to a part-time Board with respect to conflict of interest pro-
blems. This is especially so in view of the possibility of appointing a part-
time Board consisting of nontax practitioners to obviate any possible
conflict of interest problems."' However, if the inclusion of local taxes in
the Board's jurisdiction, or any other factor, resulted in sufficient case
load to warrant creation of a multi-member, full-time Board, that would
be the preferable course to follow.
Board members should be appointed for a period of approximately
six years, with staggered terms to allow for continuity. A six year term
is the predominant period provided for in other states."' Since the Board
would be a part of the executive branch, it would be appropriate to pro-
vide for appointment by the Governor with confirmation by the General
Assembly. This is also the predominant practice in states which have a
tax court or a Board of Tax Appeals."' Members' salaries should be set
12 See text accompanying notes 97-100 supra.
121 OR. REV. STAT. § 305.452 (1977).
1 Id. § 1.600. See generally Roberts, An Introduction to the Oregon Tax Court, 9
WILLAMETTE L.J. 193 (1973). Because of a shortage of state government funds, the Oregon
legislature eliminated all funds for judges pro tempore in a special session in September,
1980. Letter from Carlisle B. Roberts, Oregon Tax Court Judge, to Author (Aug. 6, 1981).
1.. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 27, at 16.
12 See text accompanying note 102 supra.
131 FTA REPORT, supra note 93, at 14.
13 A summary of provisions in the states having either a tax court or independent
board of tax appeals follows:
State No. of judges Full or Part-Time Tenure How Appointed
Arizona Div.(I) 3 Part-time 6 years Governor
Delaware 5 Part-time 3 years Governor
Hawaii 1 Full-time at the plea- Appointed by




at an amount commensurate with the amount of caseload and the
qualifications required to serve as a member of the Board. With respect
to the latter, there is no current agreement whether a statute should
prescribe qualifications for appointment to the Board. Under one alter-























ge Full or Part-Time Tenure How Appointed
3 Part-time 3 years Governor,
confirmed by Senate
3 Part-time 6 years Governor,
confirmed by Senate
5 Full-time 4 years Governor,
confirmed by Senate
3 Part-time 4 years Governor,
confirmed by Senate
3 as reouired 6 years Governor
5 Part-time 6 years Governor
5 Full-time 6 years Governor,
confirmed by
Executive Council
3 Part-time 6 years Governor,
confirmed by Senate
3 Full-time 6 years Governor,
confirmed by Senate
2 Full-time 6 years Governor,
confirmed by Senate
3 Full-time 6 years Governor,
confirmed by Senate
3 Full-time 6 years Supreme Court
11" as required* 5 years* Governor,
confirmed by Senate
-4 Part-time 4 years ex officio;
Governor
3 Full-time 6 years Governor,
confirmed by Senate
2 1 Full-time 6 years Full-time elected;
1 Part-time Part-time appointed
by Supreme Court.
5 Part-time during term ex officio
of office
















FTA REPORT, supra note 93, at 14.
* New Jersey has since adopted a tax court as part of the judicial branch. The tax court
consists of no less than six but no more than 12 full-time judges who serve for a term of
seven years. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:3A1-15 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (West).
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from a list of possible appointees selected by the Virginia Bar or some
other professional group, as is done in Oregon.1" The qualification re-
quirements in other states vary."' Some states require that there be a
certain number of attorneys or accountants on the board. Others place
regional limitations on membership. Still others have no limitation writ-
ten into the statute. New Jersey's statute is one of the more stringent
and requires that the members be "admitted to the practice of law in
this State for at least 10 years, and ... chosen for their special qualifica-
tions, knowledge and experience in matters of taxation."",
Another likely controversy is whether the circuit courts should re-
tain concurrent jurisdiction to hear tax cases. It is probable that
substantial opposition to divesting the circuit court of jurisdiction would
exist if such a proposal were made. Apparently, many attorneys and tax-
payers believe that they are likely to fare better in their own local cir-
cuit courts than they would in a statewide Board of Tax Appeals."'8 That
this may not be a misplaced belief is indicated by statistics concerning
pro-taxpayer circuit court decisions which have been reversed by the
supreme court on appeal since 1945.117 The Study Committee's recom-
mended solution to this problem was to allow the circuit courts to retain
their jurisdiction, but to continue the requirement that the taxpayer pay
the full amount of the assessment prior to proceeding in the circuit
court. At the same time, the Committee proposed permitting the tax-
payer to contest the tax in the Board of Tax Appeals, and to appeal an
adverse Board decision to the courts, prior to paying the tax." The Com-
mittee apparently hoped to strike a compromise with those who wished
to retain circuit court jurisdiction over tax cases while, at the same time,
encouraging taxpayers to use the Board of Tax Appeals by permitting
them to contest an assessment without first paying the tax.
While political realities ultimately may require that circuit courts re-
tain concurrent jurisdiction to hear tax cases, such a compromise
weakens the potential improvements available through creation of a
Board of Tax Appeals. To the extent that the circuit courts retain
jurisdiction, the advantages of consistency, of uniform statewide tax
policy, and of expertise on the part of the forum would be diminished. As
the Governor's Commission on Reform of the Property Tax System noted,
"the effectiveness of the review procedure is undermined if any alter-
nate procedure, challenge or review is permitted in local courts, as local
judges will not always be in agreement, and as a circuit court's decision
has effect in only one circuit." ' 9 Furthermore, the opportunity for tax-
133 OR. REV. STAT. § 305.452.
13 See FTA REPORT, supra note 93, at 16.
13 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 3A-13 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (West).
8 See text accompanying note 73 supra.
Seventeen out of 22 commonwealth tax cases decided in favor of the taxpayer have
been reversed on appeal by the Virginia Supreme Court since 1945. See note 12 supra.
' STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 27, at 15 & 17.
I PROPERTY TAX REFORM STUDY, supra note 79, at 23.
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payer forum shopping would remain in commonwealth tax cases. There-
fore, the ideal resolution would be to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the
Board of Tax Appeals.
A related question regarding a Board of Tax Appeals is the nature of
appeals from its decisions. Undoubtedly, both the taxpayer and the Com-
missioner should have the right to appeal an adverse Board decision to a
court. The Study Committee proposed that appeals from the Board's
decisions be taken on a record to the local circuit court.4 0 There appears
little doubt that any proceedings beyond the Board stage should be ap-
pealed on a record taken at the Board hearing. There should be no de
novo proceedings beyond the Board, in order to eliminate the wasted
resources inherent in having two de novo proceedings. The basic issue is
whether or not there should be an appeal to the circuit court or whether
appeals should be taken directly to the Virginia Supreme Court. Most
commentators have taken the position that the additional appeal to the
circuit court would add an unnecessary layer to the process."' Generally,
they reason that appeals from the Board should be to the same court
to which appeals from trial courts of general jurisdiction are taken.4
Since Virginia currently has no intermediate appellate court, appeals
would go directly to the supreme court. This suggestion may, of course,
be impractical in light of the supreme court's case load. On the other
hand, it may be that the number of appeals in tax cases to the supreme
court would not increase greatly, if at all, if there were appeals directly
from the Board to the supreme court, since appeals in tax cases now go
to the supreme court from the circuit courts. Barring a very substantial
increase in litigation resulting from the very existence of a Board of Tax
Appeals, the appeals would simply be coming from the Board rather
than from the circuit courts. In fact, the creation of a Board may reduce
the number of appeals. The Board, by its nature, would be an expert
tribunal. Hence, its decisions would probably be less likely to be over-
turned as erroneous than circuit court decisions.
While the theoretically ideal situation would be to bypass the circuit
courts, thereby retaining consistency and the other benefits of a unitary
tribunal, this may be impractical given the supreme court's present
"0 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 27, at 18.
"' See Model State Tax Court Act § 19; Revised Model State Tax Court Act § 21, 24
TAX LAW. at 951; Explanation of Revised Model State Court Act, 24 TAx LAW. at 946; Kray,
supra note 71, at 512 n.129. Kray quotes from PENNIMAN & HELLER, STATE INCOME TAX AD.
MINISTRATION 45 (Public Adm'n Serv., 1959) zfollows:
[P]roposals for court reform often emphasize that too many possibilities for
judicial appeal may defeat rather than promote justice. Few would wish to give
final decision to a single court, but the existence of several layers of appeals may
merely mean undue delay in settlement and excessive costs for both the taxpayer
and the state. Likewise, too many appeals opportunities in tax cases may chiefly
benefit the taxpayer with a poor case.
'0 See Explanation of Revised Model State Tax Court Act, 24 TAX LAW. at 946.
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situation. If this were considered an overriding factor, then the next
best solution would be to provide for a record appeal to the circuit court
from the Board. Of course, should an intermediate appellate court ever
be created in Virginia, this would be the logical forum to which appeals
would be taken.
The next issue is whether or not the Board should have jurisdiction
over local as well as commonwealth taxes. The Study Committee dealt
only with commonwealth taxes administered by the Department of Tax-
ation. Therefore, its proposed Board was given jurisdiction only over
those taxes.' There may be difficulties with giving the Board jurisdic-
tion over local taxes because of local government budget procedures.
Local governments must have a reasonable idea of what their tax base is
in order to perform their budget-making duties. An appeal to a state-
wide Board may cause difficulties by delaying the setting of the tax
base. However, the latest statewide study of the property tax system
specifically suggested that there be a statewide Board of Tax Appeals to
review property tax assessments and legal issues relating to property
taxes. 14 4 Jurisdiction over local taxes would certainly increase the
number of cases heard, thereby counteracting the argument that there
are not enough cases to warrant a full-time Board of Tax Appeals."' The
Board would also contribute to a more uniform application of the property
tax throughout the commonwealth.
One desirable aspect of a Board of Tax Appeals is the potential crea-
tion of a small claims procedure which would allow taxpayers in small
disputes to have an independent and impartial hearing of their case. As
matters currently stand, a taxpayer who is financially unable, or for
whom it is not worth the expense, to take his case to the circuit court is
effectively denied an impartial forum. The only inexpensive hearing is
with the Tax Commissioner who is also the chief enforcement officer for
the commonwealth. As the ABA Committee on State and Local Taxes re-
cognized in its Explanation of the Revised Model State Tax Court Act:
Many Taxpayers feel, rightly or wrongly, that without [an inde-
pendent determination of the tax case] they are at the mercy of
the tax administrators. Without [a small claims division], the bar
'" See generally STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 27. Because of the unique
character of the commonwealth's Corporation Commission, the Study Committee did not
consider taxes administered by that body. The procedures with respect to those taxes have
not aroused any substantial dissatisfaction, and accordingly, this article does not address
them.
I" See PROPERTY TAX REFORM STUDY, supra note 79, at 23:
[I]t is recommended that a statewide Board of Review be established for quasi-
judicial review of assessments and legal problems involving property tax. Two
types of procedure should be permitted, an informal low-cost appeal before one
judge, and a formal three judge proceeding for more important questions. Appeal
should be permitted to the Supreme Court on Writ of Error.
14 See text accompanying notes 99-100 supra.
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is left with either representing taxpayers in small cases without
compensation or refusing to help the taxpayer obtain justice.
Further, in smaller cases now, the tax authorities have to wear
two hats-judge and prosecutor-with the attending problems
and cross purposes. 46
The United States Congress enacted legislation several years ago
authorizing a small claims procedure for the United State Tax Court in
response to this very type of argument.14 This procedure should be
available to taxpayers in cases below a designated amount in dispute.
The amount should be high enough to make the small claims procedure
available in a substantial number of cases. The current jurisdictional
amount for the United States Tax Court small claims procedure is $5,000
for any one taxable year in the case of the income tax.4 The jurisdic-
tional amount for states that have instituted a small claims procedure
varies widely. Oregon's jurisdictional amount is $500, for example, while
New Jersey's is $2,000.149
The taxpayer should be informed of the small claims procedure and
given the opportunity to opt for it prior to the institution of an appeal.
The procedure should be nonprecedential in nature; that is, the decision
would not be a precedent for any other case. It should be informal so
that taxpayers find it practicable to represent themselves if they so
choose. There should be no appeal from this small claims procedure. In
other words, it should be a one-level proceeding in which the taxpayer
presents a case which is decided with the least possible amount of pro-
cedural formality. Requiring the taxpayer to forego an appeal in order to
take advantage of this special procedure should not be burdensome,
since the very reason for it is to reduce expenses and keep the pro-
ceedings as simple as possible. Because there would be no appeal,
though, it may be necessary to permit the Commissioner to object to the
small claims procedure in appropriate cases, since the use of the pro-
cedure would preclude an appeal not only by the taxpayer, but also by
the Commissioner.
The small claims procedure would eliminate the present problem of
taxpayers perceiving that it is simply not worth the cost to fight a tax
assessment. If great sums are not at stake, it is often more expedient to
give in to the taxing authority than to fight it. On the other hand, it has
been suggested that a small claims procedure is not necessary at this
time, because there are few cases where it would be utilized."8 The
reason given is that the two taxes at the commonwealth level most likely
"1 24 TAX LAW. 945, 947 (1971).
247 I.R.C. § 7463; see PROPOSALS FOR A SMALL CLAIMS TAX COURT 17-20 (Amer. Enter-
prise Inst. 1969).
I" I.R.C. § 7463(a).
... OR. REV. STAT. § 305.515; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 3A-5 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (West).
'" Forst Interview, supra note 19.
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to involve small claims are the personal income tax and the retail sales
tax. Basically, Virginia follows the decisions of the federal authorities in
personal income tax matters. Therefore, these claims generally are
decided at the federal rather than the commonwealth level. With respect
to the retail sales tax, the argument is made that most of these cases
simply involve errors in recording the total amount of sales which are
picked up on an audit. Therefore, the issue is strictly factual and
mechanical, leaving little room for dispute. This argument may have
some merit. At the same time, however, the availability of the small
claims procedure would certainly boost taxpayer morale, thus enhancing
their perceptions of the fairness and availability of the tax disputes
resolution system."' Moreover, if local taxes, especially property taxes,
were within the jurisdiction of the Board, many small assessment
disputes would certainly find their way into the small claims procedure.
Furthermore, a small claims procedure would eliminate cases which do
not require "full-scale" treatment from the Board's regular docket.1 12 It
would provide a convenient, informal, and inexpensive method for the
resolution of these types of cases. The small claims provision in Oregon
seems to have worked quite well. There is no reason why it would not
work equally well in Virginia.3
Another issue likely to arouse controversy is whether the taxpayer
should be required to pay the tax alleged to be due prior to contesting it
before the Board. The requirement of full payment prior to court review
is one of the major defects of the present system. It places the taxpayer
in the position of having to pay prior to an independent decision of his
case. The tax should not be payable prior to the decision of the Board
and resolution of any appeal from the Board's decision. An exception
might be made in cases where the Commissioner determines that collec-
tion is in jeopardy. It also may be appropriate to require the taxpayer to
post a bond for payment of the tax, especially in property tax cases
where regular collection of the tax is a prime requirement for the orderly
administration of local governments. Aside from these exceptions,
1' See Kray, supra note 71, at 512 n.132, quoting Dane, The Experience of
Massachusetts, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATORS 25th
ANNUAL CONFERENCE 40 (1958):
We must always bear in mind that taxpayers' morale is a sine qua non of ef-
fective tax administration. The more a tax appeal tribunal takes on the attributes
of a court and the less it looks like the same old rapacious tax wolves dressed up
in sheeps clothing, the more public acceptance its decisions will have.
' See FTA REPORT, supra note 93, at 8 and 27.
I The New Jersey legislature, in its more recent tax court legislation, included small
claims procedures with a jurisdictional amount of $2,000. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3A-5 (Cum.
Supp. 1981) (West). It is significant to note that while the original Model State Tax Court
Act did not include a small claims procedure, the Revised Act, presumably the result of
more refined thinking on the subject, does provide for a small claims procedure. Revised
Model State Tax Court Act §§ 25-33, 24 TAX LAW. at 951-52.
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however, the taxpayer should not be required to pay prior to full, in-
dependent, and impartial review of the assessment.
Finally, the taxpayer should probably be required to exhaust his ad-
ministrative remedies before the Commissioner prior to proceeding to
the Board of Tax Appeals. Some taxpayers may consider this a futile ef-
fort, and it is true that in situations where the lines are clearly drawn
this will be the case. Nevertheless, the administrative remedy does pro-
vide an informal and flexible procedure for taxpayers and the Commis-
sioner to air their differences, and settle ones on which they can agree.
At the sime time, those issues which cannot be settled become more nar-
rowly delineated. The administrative remedy is therefore a valuable
part of the procedure and its utilization should be maximized. However,
proceedings before the Board should not be on any record made of the
administrative proceeding. Hearings before the Board should be de
novo, in order to assure the taxpayer of a full hearing on all the issues in
dispute before an impartial tribunal.
Relatively noncontroversial features of the Board should be a re-
quirement that it publish findings of fact and conclusions of law in all its
regular-nonsmall claims -decisions. This would build up the body of
precedent which is now so sorely lacking. The Board should also have
the authority to make and publish its own rules of procedure to assure
the existence of rules compatible with the peculiarities of commonwealth
and local tax litigation, and should be authorized to hold hearings at loca-
tions throughout the commonwealth. This would follow the lead of the
United States Tax Court in bringing the forum to the taxpayer. ' "
V. Conclusion
Present Virginia tax procedures need to be significantly restruc-
tured in order to assure Virginia taxpayers a competent, fair, and impar-
tial consideration of their tax appeals. The Virginia General Assembly
should be encouraged to create a statewide Board of Tax Appeals. Adop-
tion of such a body, and careful consideration of the related administra-
tive, resource, and jurisdictional questions, should provide Virginia tax-
payers with a much-improved tax appeals procedure.
'" The recent New Jersey legislation provides for courtrooms and offices for the tax
court located in two designated cities-Trenton, and Newark-and for chambers or offices
in other appropriate locations throughout the state as "may be from time to time necessary
to accommodate taxpayers or the calendar of the tax court." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 3A-2
(Cum. Supp. 1981) (West).
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